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Introduction
As of 2011, national statistics in China were suggesting that the share of 
China’s urban population had exceeded the 50 per cent threshold for the first 
time in its history. This is taken as an endorsement of China’s entering an 
‘urban age’, though such claims in official urban discourses have been 
criticised in recent literature (see for example, Brenner and Schmid 2014; see 
also Shin 2018). Higher urbanisation rates are supported not only by the 
natural growth of urban population but also by the conversion of rural 
villagers into urban citizens. The latter process further entails land grabbing, 
which converts existing agricultural farmlands into urban construction lands 
to accommodate the provision of new real estate properties (e.g new 
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apartments, offices), infrastructure (e.g. motorways and high-speed rail) and 
production facilities (e.g. industrial parks). What do all these mean for 
villagers who lose access to their farmlands?  
We often hear the frustrations of villagers whose lands are violently taken 
away against their will with no or poor compensations (e.g. Hoffman 2014; 
Johnson 2013; Pomfret 2013). Sargeson (2013) argues that violence is an 
integral element of China’s urbanisation project, authorising urban 
development. In this chapter, we show that such use of state violence goes 
hand in hand with another dimension of state action, that is co-optation of 
villagers (cf. Gramsci 1971) by the imposition of what Henri Lefebvre (2003) 
refers to as ‘official urbanism’. Drawing on Lefebvre’s critiques of urbanism, 
this chapter aims to reflect upon the use of official urbanism to advance 
China’s ‘urban age’, and addresses two analytical objectives by dissecting 
green belt policy in Beijing. First, we demonstrate China’s urbanism as an 
institution and an ideology is a state project: it is integrated with both 
economic and political practices, and plays a critical role in sustaining the 
state strategy of land-based accumulation. Second, we also illustrate that 
official urbanism, as an ideology, has been successfully instilled into the 
national ethos, imposing it upon the population (especially villagers) as a new 
and desirable way of life, which in turn supports the state’s project of 
urbanism. We conclude that urbanism is one and the same expression of 
politics of urban space, with the Party-state’s ideological, economic and 
political ambitions put at the centre. For this reason, any meaningful 
approach to critiquing existing sets of urban knowledge and practice that 
produces urban inequalities and injustice in contemporary China should start 
from negation of the ‘official urbanism’.  
Empirically, this chapter focuses on the making and commercialisation of 
Beijing’s green belts; it investigates the ideological, political, and economic 
mechanisms for erecting the green belts project on the one hand, and, on the 
other, uncovers the discursive moment when this project was successfully 
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instilled into the ethos of the population as the only desirable way of life in 
urban change. This story hence shows vividly the juncture where two aspects 
of the ‘official urbanism’ – institution and ideology – were dialectically 
articulated with each other. 
Urbanism and the State
For Louis Wirth (1938), the city not only refers to larger dwelling places and 
workshops, but also marks ‘the initiating and controlling centre of economic, 
political, and cultural life’ in the era of industrialisation when the role of the 
city looms large. One methodological implication of these socio-economic 
changes is that the urban-industrial mode of living rose to such a significant 
status that it could be juxtaposed with the rural-folk society as two ideal types 
of communities (ibid. 3). Drawing on this recognition, Wirth then defines 
urbanism as a way of living (in an industrial society) and calls for the 
attentions of the American sociologists to the urban mode of human 
association. He rightly asserts that urbanism should not be confused with the 
city or industrialism: as the new mode of life, urbanism is neither limited by 
‘the arbitrary boundary line’ of the city (ibid. 4) nor solely conditioned or 
determined by modern capitalism and industrialism (ibid. 7). In efforts ‘to 
discover the forms of social action and organisation’ (ibid. 9), Wirth identifies 
three fundamental attributes of urbanism to direct sociological studies of the 
city: population size, population density in a settlement, and the heterogeneity 
of urban dwellers. Yet, there is a marked lack of attention to the politico-
economic relations and processes underlying the production of urbanism. 
In The Urban Revolution, Lefebvre (2003: 6) argues that urbanism has often 
been understood as ‘a social practice that is fundamentally scientific and 
technical’, while in reality it ‘exists as a policy (having institutional and 
ideological components)’. For Lefebvre, urbanism is indeed ‘a form of class 
urbanism’ (ibid. 157), and ‘[i]t is only from an ideological and institutional 
point of view…that urbanism reveals to critical analysis the illusions that it 
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harbours and that foster its implementation’ (ibid. 164). Indeed, urbanism is a 
superstructure of the society (ibid. 163), one that is ontologically connected 
with both the logic of capital and the rationale of the state. While Lefebvre’s 
discussions of urbanism are rooted in his critique of capitalist societies, it has 
much to enlighten researchers on urban China where the emphasis on 
urbanisation has been stressed heavily by the state. 
Facing the onset of intensifying urbanisation during the early years of market 
reform, urbanism has been subject to scholarly attention among China 
researchers. Ma (2002) is among the first authors who adopted the concept of 
urbanism in setting research agendas for the study of China’s urban 
transformation, referring to urbanism as “the nature of urban life and of cities 
as places that are seen as impregnated with geographic, social, economic, 
cultural, political, and ideological meanings” (ibid. 1556; original emphasis). 
He further develops his perspectives on urbanism in his subsequent work, in 
which he provides a summary review of historically identifiable forms of 
urbanism (Ma 2009). Here, instead of focusing on the connotation of 
urbanism as a way of life in the industrial age (cf. Wirth 1938), Ma broadens 
its scope to such an extent that China’s 5,000-year history is divided into five 
periods and narrated using urbanism as an anchor. While Ma (2002: 1563) 
highlights the importance of investigating ‘the central role that the Party-state 
has played in affecting the processes and outcomes of urbanization and 
urbanism’, how the working of the Party-state and the particular 
configurations of the political economy of reformist China produces its own 
urbanism is left unanswered and remains as a challenge for other scholars to 
address. 
A number of China scholars have paid attention to the need of understanding 
urbanism as an embodiment of the dynamics of the state, space and social 
fabrics. Cartier (2002), for instance, resorts to transnational urbanism to 
examine Shenzhen’s attempt to transform into a world city by producing a 
new city centre realised through the state-dominated enterprise that makes 
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use of ‘plans, ideologies and representations of domestic and transnational 
élites to establish legitimacy’ (ibid. 1513). In Cartier’s analysis, the spatial and 
politico-economic processes of producing urban landscapes are uncovered, 
which in turn enable her discussions on how ‘trans-boundary and 
transnational spheres of economic activity and cultural forms’ (ibid.  1518) are 
articulated to endorse the ‘spiritual civilisation campaign’ of the state in the 
urbanisation process. 
Chen Yingfang (2008) and You-Tien Hsing (2010) also analyse the nature of 
urbanism in China’s urban transformation, seeing it as a set of discourses that 
legitimise the state’s conduct. For Chen (2008), the idea of ‘new urbanism’ is 
linked to the idea of modernisation in endorsing the state’s consolidation of its 
‘opportunity space’ for producing and exploiting the urban space, where the 
land businesses of the state are developed to an unprecedented scale. Hsing 
(2010: 54) makes a similar argument through the comparison between 
development zones in the 1990s (as a symptom of industrialism) and the 'new 
city' projects in the 2000s (which signal the rise of urbanism), concluding that 
the term ‘urbanism seems to have provided a unifying ideology for the 
political elite’. With urbanism as a shared analytical concept, Cartier registers 
local politico-economic mechanisms in producing the urban space, while Chen 
and Hsing both show how urbanism has been deployed by the Party-state in 
China as a core ideology.  
The recognition of urbanism as both an ideology and an institution has also 
been developed in recent discussions on eco-/green urbanism and speculative 
urbanism. Hoffman (2011) analyses the making of a ‘model garden city’ in 
Dalian and uncovers urban modelling – such as ‘green urbanism’ – as a 
governmental practice. This practice not only shapes and produces the urban 
space with ideas from elsewhere, through the mechanism of inter-referencing 
of policy discourses, but also remakes urban subjects through the combination 
of greening practices with “the fostering of civilised and quality citizens” (ibid. 
67). Pow and Neo (2015: 132) draw on Hoffman’s conclusion and explore the 
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case of Tianjin Eco-city to decipher the ‘new forms of ecological urban 
imagineering and socio-ecological life-worlds’. They conclude that Tianjin 
Eco-city is at best an ‘ecological imagineering of green urbanism’ (ibid. 139), 
thus serving as a vivid case of the complex interactions between urban 
sustainability, urban entrepreneurialism and neoliberal urbanism. Also 
focusing on the Tianjin Eco-city, Caprotti (2014; Caprotti et al. 2015) 
investigates the concrete connections among environment discourses, the 
market logic, the social fabric of dispossession, and the rise of the new urban 
poor at the juncture of ‘green capitalism.’ By asking whom the suffix ‘eco’ is 
for, they uncover politico-economic mechanisms and social effects of the 
Chinese agenda of the ‘ecological modernisation,’ which only result in the 
booming of elite urbanism and ‘the construction of eco-enclaves’ (Caprotti et 
al. 2015: 509), consequentially sacrificing the ordinary citizens and their 
everyday life. 
Elsewhere outside the scope of China urban studies, urbanism as both an 
institution and an ideology also underlies the work of Goldman (2011) who 
conceptualises ‘speculative urbanism’ in his study of peripheral urbanisation 
of Bangalore, India. Drawing on the epistemological critiques of urbanism, 
Goldman sees land speculation and dispossession of people at the urban 
periphery as the principal state business in Bangalore’s making of the ‘next 
world city’ (ibid. 555). Such practices institutionalise the ‘temporary state of 
exception’ into the ‘new forms of “speculative” government, economy, 
urbanism and citizenship’ (ibid. 555), which defines what he labels 
‘speculative urbanism.’ This discussion is noteworthy for its refusal of the use 
of urbanism only at its face value. Instead, urbanism is seen as the critical 
moment in the urban process, which is shaping, and being shaped by, socio-
historical conditions and politico-economic mechanisms constituting urban 
changes. With this concern, Shin’s (2012) work on China also recognises the 
preponderance of place-specific accumulation strategies of the Party-state 
through the examination of mega events as urban spectacles. These strategies 
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are deployed in a geographically uneven manner to shape the Chinese version 
of ‘speculative urbanism’ (Shin 2013; 2014).  
In this chapter, we highlight how urbanism works as a concrete mechanism 
through which the urban space is utilised by the state for its own goals – no 
matter how dynamic and transient these goals are – so as to sustain its 
legitimacy and to reproduce social/power relations. Put it in another way, we 
see urbanism as a permanence of the daily life under urbanisation where 
politico-economic concerns of the state are crystallised into a coherent 
ideology and embodied within the associated institutions. Through the 
examination of the rise of China’s official urbanism in the green belts project, 
we argue for greater responsibility of researchers to investigate these tangible 
institutions and ideologies rather than to adopt urbanism only as an empty 
signifier that obscures the nature, agency and rationale of the state. 
Official urbanism as a state project
In his critiques of the potential urban strategies in the socialist countries, 
Lefebvre (2003: 147) presents an explicit definition of ‘official urbanism’. On 
the one hand, socialist urbanism is also a type of urbanism, and is hence ‘not 
very dissimilar from capitalist urbanism’ (ibid. 147) in terms of its nature as 
an institution and an ideology. On the other hand, because of an 
overwhelming emphasis on the ideology of industrial production, the socialist 
version of urbanism tends to exhibit such characters as ‘less emphasis on the 
centrality of exchange’, ‘greater access to the soil,’ attention to ‘an increase in 
the amount of green space’, and ‘the zero degree of urban reality’ (ibid. 147). 
His observation was made in 1970, when socialism as a state institution and a 
seat for geo-political power had not yet disintegrated, and when the Stalinist 
model of economic growth was still predominant in most socialist countries 
(including China). The ideology of industrial production and ‘the zero degree 
of urban reality’ rendered China’s urban space into the situation labelled by 
Ma (1976) ‘anti-urbanism’. This condition in turn laid a politico-economic 
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foundation for importing the idea of ‘green belt’ into Beijing out of its concern 
for green space (Zhao 2016), and, accordingly, shaping the ‘official urbanism’. 
Simply put, the idea of green belt was imported to Beijing from Britain and 
the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereafter USSR) in the 1950s, 
which was seen at that time as a promising ecological goal of its socialist 
transition (Beijing Archives 1958). Indeed, it arrived in Beijing at the height of 
a socialist-utopian campaign named the ‘Great Leap Forward’ (大跃进, 
dayuejin). This was a period when the Chinese people were mobilised by Mao 
Zedong to ‘surpass Great Britain and then catch up with the United States’ (超
英赶美, chaoying ganmei). Among targets of this campaign, ‘gardening the 
earth’ (大地园林化, dadi yuanlinhua) was set as a socio-ecological goal (Chen 
1996; CPC 1958). Six decades have passed since the green belt arrived in 
Beijing as an idea, and a sea change was witnessed with regard to China’s 
social and politico-economic conditions (Ma 2002; Wu 1997). Nevertheless, 
the green belt is still defining Beijing’s urban master plan right now, as it did 
in 1958 when the very first modern master plan of Beijing was drawn out 
(Yang 2009; Zhao 2016). Between the survival of the green belt in the master 
plan and the changing urban political economy lies the secret of the Party-
state and the role of its official urbanism. 
To understand changing rationales of the Party-state hidden behind the 
official urbanism, it becomes necessary not only to investigate the 
institutional dynamics but also to explore how far they are achieved spatially 
in the urbanisation process. The concrete mechanism through which the 
urban space is utilised by the state for its dynamic goals is the milieu in which 
we can recognise and define the official urbanism. In this section, we focus on 
three aspects of such mechanism that shapes Beijing’s green belt, namely, the 
ideological, the political and the economic.  1
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Shifting ideological connotations
The articulation between Beijing’s green belt and the official urbanism was 
established through the ideological connotations of the former. In the Maoist 
era, the official urbanism was set in tune with the ideology of industrial 
production. The imposition of green belt at that time was mainly serving the 
ambition of industrialisation-cum-modernisation by segregating industrial 
areas from residential ones on the one hand (BMCUP 1987: 199-200) and by 
‘gardening the earth’ on the other  (Chen 1996). In the 1958 Beijing Master 
Plan, the Beijing Municipal Government (hereafter BMG) claims (BMCUP 
1987: 206-207) that:  
In the last few years, the scale of redeveloping and 
expanding the city proper has been huge. The urban 
layout should not be too concentrated, and a dispersed 
and clustering model is to be applied from now on. 
There should be green spaces between clusters: 40% of 
the city proper and 60% of inner suburbs are to be 
greened. In the green spaces, we will have woods, fruit 
trees, flowers, lakes and crops. 
This master plan was drafted with direct instructions from the USSR experts, 
who arrived at Beijing in April 1955, bringing the Soviet version of modernist 
planning principles together with them (BMCUP 1987: 32).  In this plan, the 
form of the imagined green belt was largely following the modernist planning 
canon (such as zoning techniques and the landscape of the garden city), while 
its content was defined by the utopian vision of making China modern and 
compromised by the industrialisation of the city. Such a utopian experiment is 
transient and the content of the belt is accordingly transformed together with 
the political economy. But first of all, it is the ideological connotations of the 
green belt that change before anything else.  
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In the post-Mao era, the previous focus on industrial production in China’s 
official urbanism gave way to such issues as social order, hygiene and 
internationalisation. In 1980, the Central Secretariat of the Communist Party 
of China (hereafter CPC) issued an ‘important instruction’ to the BMG, which 
highlights that ‘Beijing is the political centre of our country, and it is also the 
centre for international contacts… Economic development policies should also 
be changed according to the nature of the capital, and heavy industries should 
cease to be developed’ (BMCUP 1987: 75). In the 1982 Master Plan, it was 
further stated that Beijing was to be the ‘political and cultural centre of our 
country’ (BMCUP 1987: 78). Ten years later, this was revised again to refer to 
Beijing as the ‘modern and international city’ (BMCUP 1992; Zhang 2001: 
274-275). Hence, the Maoist (industrial) imagination of ‘being modern’ was 
transformed into the yearning to be ‘international’, and this in turn 
restructures both the official urbanism and the role of the green belts in line 
with the new urban development direction.  
One of the key methods to put the yearning of internationalisation into 
practice was to host such mega events as Olympic Games. Jia Qinglin, the 
then Party Secretary of Beijing, claimed in an official meeting that bidding for 
the 2008 Olympic Games was not only ‘a historical opportunity to accelerate 
Beijing’s development in the new century and to move Beijing forward to a 
modern and international metropolis’, but also ‘a perfect approach to show 
our achievements in the city’s modernisation process and to augment its 
international reputation’ (Beijing Youth Daily 2000). The role of green belts 
loomed large here. In Beijing’s first bid for the Olympic Games in 1993, its 
level of pollution had dissatisfied inspectors from the IOC, indeed partly 
explaining that failure (China Internet Information Centre 2001).  As the 2
BMG noticed the importance of the environmental issue in international 
assessments, represented by IOC’s preferences and inscribed in the 1996 
edition of The Olympic Charter (IOC 1996), every effort was at once made in 
Beijing to meet the expectations – for example, it promised in 2001 that a 
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green belt of more than 100 million square metres would soon surround 
Beijing (BOCOG 2001).  
The BMG stressed the role of ecology and environment to such an extent that 
‘Green Olympics’ was ranked the most important initiative (Green Olympics, 
Sci-Tech Olympics, and Humanistic Olympics) in their bidding for the 2008 
Olympic Games (Xinhua News Agency 2001). And through this initiative, 
green belts were brought to the fore once again in reshaping this city. The 
concern of green and the appeal to modern-international were juxtaposed 
here, revealing the new focus of official urbanism and setting up a substantial 
and legitimised pretext for completely different political and economic 
ambitions of the state.  
Political mobilisation through institutional restructuring
On 29 September 1999, five months after submitting its formal application 
report to the IOC, the BMG held an Office Meeting for Mayor and Deputy 
Mayors and decided to establish a new agent entitled the ‘Beijing Leading 
Group for Constructing the Green Belt Area’ (北京市绿化隔离地区建设领导小组, 
Beijingshi lvhua geli diqu jianshe lingdao xiaozu; hereafter BLGCGB) (BMG 
1999). This leading group was designated as the municipal agent taking 
charge of all issues related to the green belts project. On 2 March 2000, the 
BLGCGB held its first formal meeting, headed by the then Mayor Liu Qi (BMG 
2000a), to establish its General Headquarters (总指挥部, zong zhihuibu). This 
meeting also witnessed the setting up of a goal by Mayor Liu to finish the 
greening of 60 square kilometres within the next three years, considerably 
quicker than ten years previously planned. Here, ‘a fierce battle [was] needed 
immediately’, in the next nine months, ‘to meet the annual goal of greening 20 
square kilometres’ (ibid.). Furthermore, since it was a huge challenge, Mayor 
Liu continued, ‘our cadres are encouraged to break through traditional 
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doctrines and regulations and figure out special measures for this special task; 
and with these measures new institutions can also be erected’ (ibid.). 
Dozens of documents were released by the BMG in the next couple of years to 
institutionalise and systematise their ambitions oriented around the green 
belts. The very first document as such was a scalar one to get rid of the central 
government’s ban on occupying arable land for urban constructions. In May 
2000, the Ministry of Land and Resources of China established a 
‘Coordination Liaison Group for Constructing Beijing’s Green Belt’ and issued 
a document entitled ‘Instructions on the implementation of Beijing’s green 
belt project’ (Chai 2002: 6). Its special institutional arrangement was to lift 
the central ban on the BMG by setting up two exceptions. First, the use of 
arable land in the green belt for planting trees could be registered as an 
internal adjustment to the agricultural structure, hence was exempted and 
permitted. Second, occupying arable land to construct resettlement housing 
for local villagers could also be allowed, insofar as the original settlement was 
to be demolished and greened (ibid. 6-7). Such exceptions were formalised in 
a local ordinance issued by the BMG (2001a), adopted as a new institutional 
foundation for directing the state actions to lead the green belts project.  
After the exceptional revision of the state’s land policies in the green belt area, 
the BMG set up a new and distinct governing mode for the green belt area. 
The two principles underlying this mode were called ‘special issues, special 
treatments’ (特事特办, teshi teban) and the ‘all-in-one service package’ (一条龙服
务, yitiaolong fuwu) (BMG 2000b; BLGCGB 2000a, 2000b). Because 'it was 
challenging to achieve the goal of greening 60 square kilometres in only three 
years' (BMG 2000a), as the BMG claimed, the previous urban plan was to be 
adjusted properly to fully respect opinions in the localities so as to accelerate 
the greening process (BMG 2000b). On top of this, the related land, housing, 
and administration policies were all subject to revision to clear the way for the 
green belts project. Since the Olympic bidding rendered the green belts 
project politically urgent, green light had shone everywhere in the 
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bureaucracy to further accelerate related practices in the exceptional space 
thus created (BLGCGB 2000a, 2000b; BMG 2001b). For instance, some of the 
compulsory documents in the approval process were exempted (e.g. feasibility 
study reports for construction projects) (ibid.) to simplify the procedure and 
improve efficiency. The political manoeuvres as such, however, did not induce 
the expected outcome of a green landscape of the city – which only appeared 
on paper (Yang and Zhou 2007). Such an unexpected result cannot be 
understood if the state’s land businesses were not included in our discussion 
of the green belts.  
Land businesses: The economics of the green belts
It has been widely recognised that the state’s monopolisation of urban land 
and the commercialisation of houses were put at the top of its agenda since 
the 1990s (Hsing 2010; Lin 2009; Wu 1995, 1997), and the local state has 
become de facto landlords (Shin 2009b). In practice, however, specific land 
institutions were not established at once. It was only in 1998, after the second 
revision of the Land Management Act (NPC 1998), when the state underlined 
its ethos of the use of land resources, which reads: ‘we should insist on the 
simultaneous exploitation and saving of land resources, with saving coming 
first’ (State Council 2000). With the State Council’s encouragement, the BMG 
set up a ‘land reservation system’ on 31 January 2002 to consolidate its 
monopolistic power in the booming land market (BMG 2002a). However, the 
green belts were excluded from the newly established land reservation system, 
and thus from the land market. This exclusion should be interpreted through 
a scalar perspective on the change of land leasing methods at the time in 
China.  
In the 1990s, land leasing in comprehensive development projects was found 
to be dominated by closed-door negotiation (协议出让, xieyi churang) rather 
than auction (拍卖, paimai) (Wu 1995, 1997; Fang and Zhang 2003). Many 
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researchers in China urban studies at the time tended to see such phenomena 
as a symptom of China’s immature land market and to call for more 
marketisation measures (Ho and Lin 2003; Zhou 2004; Zhu 2000). 
Nevertheless, the key issue in this regard would not be the maturity of the 
land market, but territorial-scalar politics and its effects on the everyday 
practices of state agents. It is gradually made clear that the closed-door 
negotiation was a rational choice for the local state agents, which enabled 
them to maintain autonomy in urban space production and also to obtain 
monetary revenues and hidden benefits for themselves (instead of sharing 
them with the central government) (Wu 1997: 660; Wu et al. 2007: 6-8). In 
the light of the revision of the Land Administration Law in 1998, the State 
Council issued a series of land regulations in order to change its weak position 
in the process of land commodification. Two consequent ordinances were 
released by the Ministry of Land and Resources (hereafter MLR) in 2002 (No.
11) and 2004 (No.71). In particular, the State Council aimed at introducing a 
quota system for land use conversion so that the amount of newly made urban 
construction land was to be regulated by the central state (Xu and Yeh 2009). 
The decision was so significant in affecting the land and housing market that 
the media at the time labelled it China’s new ‘land revolution' (Hsing 2010: 
48; MLR 2002, 2004).  
The responses from local governments were anything but obedience to the 
centre. In Beijing, for example, the BMG issued a local regulation soon after 
the No.11 Ordinance, listing four kouzi (口子; i.e., loopholes for evading central 
orders) (BMG 2002b). This measure allowed four types of projects to evade 
the central state regulations: they were projects in green belts, in small towns, 
for redeveloping old and dilapidated areas, and for developing high-tech 
industries. In the end, as Hsing (2010: 52-53) describes, most urban projects 
can be categorised as part of these kouzi if they obtain an endorsement from 
municipal or district officials. From June to October 2002, the BMG leased 
out nearly 90 million square metres of land through closed-door negotiations 
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in just four months, all legitimised under the above four exceptions, while the 
total area of all land plots leased out in Beijing from 1992 to 2002 had been 
only 98.11 million square metres (Yu 2004). In the 2003 inspection of the 
national land market, the MLR noticed that 98 per cent of the land plots in 
Beijing were still leased by closed-door negotiations, of which 50 per cent 
turned out to be illegal (ibid.). In the designated green belt area, in particular, 
the area of construction land increased by 8.3 million square metres between 
2000 (69.5 million square metres) and 2005 (77.8 million square metres) 
(BAUPD 2013). The role of green belts was hence looming large in legitimising 
and promoting the (local) state’s land businesses.  
More than this, the green belts were also deployed in consolidating the BMG 
and its affiliated companies’ ‘small treasury' as well as the business 
opportunities of related localities (villages or townships). On 6 August 2002, 
the General Headquarters of the BLGCGB declared that remaining 
construction land plots in the first green belt were all allocated to the ‘Green 
Belt Infrastructure Development and Construction Company’, an enterprise 
founded by the BMG in 2000 (BLGCGB 2002). While the advertised goal was 
to enable this company to provide adequate urban infrastructure for the green 
belt area – an aim mostly unfulfilled (BAUPD 2013) – its real concern was 
with the rising land interests: 243.22 hectares of construction land plots, all 
with a huge potential value, were occupied overnight by this BMG-owned 
company (BLGCGB 2002). On the other hand, to motivate the participation of 
villages and townships in producing the green space, the BMG allowed these 
localities to run the so-called 'green-based industries' on 3-5 per cent of its 
total green area. In total, 41 projects were approved in the green belts between 
2000 and 2012, of which 23 were for games and sports (by and large, golf 
courses) (see Figure 3-1), five for leisure and vacation (resorts), six for 
ecological tourism, and seven for business apartments (BAUPD 2013). Under 
such a green mask, the number of golf courses in Beijing after 2004 increased 
from 20 to 70 (Du 2011), even though 2004 was also the year when the State 
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Council (2004) halted the construction of new golf courses all over the 
country. 
!  
Figure 3-1 A golf course in the planned second green belt 
Source: Photograph by Yimin Zhao, 19 October 2014. 
With the above discussions, it becomes clear that Beijing’s green belts, an 
imported component of its modernist layout, was made into a powerful tool to 
contribute to the local state’s land-based accumulation in the last two decades. 
This change was possible because the ideological connotation of the green 
belts was rewritten by the changing needs of the Party-state to make Beijing a 
‘modern and international’ city. The ideological transformation was then 
practised to prepare for bidding for 2008 Olympic Games, enabling both the 
institutional restructuring and political mobilisation at the city level. The 
designation of exceptions and the change of institutions, in turn, laid the 
political foundation for the booming land businesses of the state in the green 
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belts. However, even under this political setting, it is still not clear why the 
large number of villagers, who were subject to relocation when the land 
projects were unfolding, were compelled to accept the state actions. To 
understand this puzzle, it is necessary to see how and how far this set of 
institutions as a whole was turned into an effective ideology and 
preconditioned the success of the state-led and land-based accumulation. 
From the official urbanisms to the only way of life
As indicated at the outset of this chapter, politico-economic mechanisms 
underlie the formation and sustenance of official urbanism. For Lefebvre 
(2003), existing urban vocabularies that used to shape our conventional 
understanding of urbanism were compiled in the industrial age, while the 
urban problematic has already surpassed the industrial counterpart and 
become the predominant one. Hence, ‘urbanism only serves to more cruelly 
illuminate the blind [between the industrial and the urban]’, where 'the urban 
is veiled; it flees thought, which blinds itself, and becomes fixated only on a 
clarity that is in retreat from the actual’ (ibid. 40-41). The gap between the 
institutional and ideological construct represented by official urbanism on the 
one hand and the politico-economic reality on the other is especially 
significant in China, where official urbanism shapes the urban mode of living 
into only one direction: urbanisation means modernisation (Li 2013). The 
Party-state aims to restructure the landscape of the peripheries in a 
completely urban way; for this aim, the lifestyle of local villagers needs to be 
remade in order to conform to the restructured landscape and urban 
imaginaries. This is the process in which the above set of institutions in the 
green belts are wrapped into an ideology and successfully instilled into the 
ethos of the population as the only desirable way of life in the urban age. 
In the project agenda of Beijing’s green belts, released on 20 March 2000, the 
BMG (2000a) claimed that speeding up the construction of the green belt area 
is significant for rectifying the social disorder, facilitating the urbanisation 
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process, and accelerating the sustainable development of the ecology, the 
economy and the society as a whole. In this pattern of social improvement, it 
continued, ‘the rural mode of production and lifestyle should be urbanised, 
which is critical for the improvement of their life quality’ (BMG 2000b). In 
this way, the green belts project was interpreted, ideologically, as an upgrade 
of the way of peasants’ life. This marks the juncture where the two aspects of 
‘official urbanism’ – institutions and ideology – were dialectically articulated. 
Concrete measures were immediately practised by the BMG to materialise 
such an ideology and hence to instill it as a belief of the peasants whose lives 
were to be fundamentally transformed thereafter. The measures could be 
summarised with two categories: relocation (安置, anzhi) and hukou upgrading 
(转居, zhuanju).  
For the relocation of local villagers, various ‘new village’ projects were carried 
out with the endorsement of the BMG. Townships and village collectives were 
allowed to cooperate with the private property developers for property 
development and enjoy interest-free bank loans. In addition to building flats 
for the relocation of local villagers who were members of the village 
collectives, commodity housing units were also built in order to generate 
profits to finance the project costs and guarantee profits of developers. This 
was on condition that the total floor space of the commodity housing units 
was less than that of the relocation flats (BMG 2000b). According to a local 
official from BMCUP (interviewed on 1 August 2014), such procedures were 
defined as ‘upgrading to the storied buildings’ (上楼, shanglou), representing a 
physical transformation of a rural mode of living. On the other hand, the 
social welfares aspect was also attended to by the BMG, which was 
implemented through the process of ‘hukou upgrading’. The hukou system is 
indeed ‘one of the most important mechanisms determining entitlement to 
public welfare, urban services and, more broadly, full citizenship’ (Chan and 
Buckingham 2008: 587) in China. In light of the Stalinist/Maoist ideology of 
industrial production, the system has long favoured urban citizens since its 
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introduction in the late 1950s. Here, in the green belts project, the implicated 
local villagers were entitled to urban hukou status, thus becoming eligible to 
fully state-sponsored social welfare provision.  
Drawing on the above two categories of upgrading (the physical and the social 
welfares), the BMG continued to declare that ‘[we should] fully respect the 
role of peasants as the subject of the construction of the green belt area” (BMG 
2000b). This is the moment when the BMG tried to persuade the implicated 
population to accept the green belts project as the only channel towards a new 
and desirable way of life, and hence to establish the consensus on all related 
politico-economic institutions hidden behind the project. The persuasion 
succeeded in a straightforward way since it matched quite well with the desire 
of villagers who were also eager to change their living environment and the 
lifestyle in the process of urbanisation. For, the area implicated by the green 
belts project was the same area where most of the migrant workers stayed 
when they arrived at the city. This demographic change in the local 
communities induced a specific socio-economic situation, in which:  
The inflowing of so many migrant workers put great 
pressures on our infrastructure – environmental 
hygiene, electricity and water, and maintaining public 
order. It was common all over this area to find criminal 
activities spreading. Hence, we were feeling lucky that 
our old village got demolished quickly and our villagers 
relocated to storied buildings quite smoothly. Villages 
nearby, which are yet waiting for demolition, always tell 
us how envious they are.  
(Interview with a village cadre, 11 December 2014)  
The above quote shows how far the official discourses and ideology were 
accepted by the villagers, who felt the negative impacts in their daily lives but 
did not take the single step forward to ask why. Instead of discerning the 
origin of such effects in the misconduct of the state, they were rather 
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subordinating themselves to the official discourse. Since the built 
environment in reality was indeed dirty and messy, it was also their wish to 
transform it. But the only way they had worked out for doing this was the 
modernist spatial imagination of urban space that enables the state’s land 
businesses to flourish in the green belt area. Both state agents and villagers 
advocated that ‘urbanisation is the only way towards modernisation’ (Li 2013) 
– and it marks the moment when the ideological consensus is erected and the 
‘official urbanism’ consolidated. This situation echoes Shin’s (2014) 
recognition of the widely shared belief that the ‘city makes life happier’, a 
slogan of Shanghai EXPO in 2010, which articulates techniques of the state 
and desires of villagers, and which turns out to be the ideological foundation 
for the state’s land business.  
Such a collusion between the state agents and the local villagers can be 
registered even more vividly via the responses of the latter in their everyday 
life. In a township called Sunhe located on the northeastern outskirt of 
Beijing’s central districts, the green belts project became influential in the 
early 2000s when more trees were to be planted along the Airport Expressway 
in preparation for the ‘Green Olympics’. One hundred and thirty-five 
households of villagers who lived along the expressway were relocated, with 
490,000 Yuan or approximately £51,000 of compensation fees paid to each 
household.  Relocated villagers told their stories quite happily because it was 3
before housing prices in Beijing had begun to rocket upwards, and they could 
buy a resettlement flat with around 220,000 Yuan, less than a half of the 
compensation fees they received (Interview with villagers in Sunhe, 23 and 24 
December 2014). In other interviews, villagers revealed that conditions of life 
after relocation were better than the previous ones because of associated 
exceptional and privileged treatments (see Figure 3-2):  
The quality of my new flats is quite high. They are in a 
high-rise building, with more than ten stories, which 
even has lifts! This makes my life convenient because I 
Page !  of !20 37
am not agile at all after a surgery several years ago. 
Though the interior design is not the style I prefer most 
(with three double bedrooms), I am still quite happy 
with these new flats.  
(Interview with a villager in Sunhe, 23 December 2014) 
All facilities we can expect [in the urban life] were 
installed, such as the running water, the electricity, the 
natural gas, and the heating equipment. They render the 
living here much more comfortable than our previous 
life in the old village. In addition, our hukou status is also 
changed into the urban category, which means we are 
now enjoying social welfares that are exclusively for the 
“urban citizens”. However, the “soft environment” in this 
community is still unsatisfactory – but the main reason 
is that the peasants have not been dropped their old 
habits yet. For example, quite a few of them eliminated 
the lawn in the public space to plant vegetables. I think 
five to ten years are needed before them changing habits.  
(Interview with villagers in Sunhe, 21 July 2015) 
In these acclamations of the new urban mode of living, the Party-state’s 
official urbanism was successfully instilled into the common sense of the 
population and this in turn legitimated the former’s political mobilisation for 
land businesses.  
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Figure 3-2 The street view of the resettlement community in Sunhe 
Source: Photography by Yimin Zhao, 17 December 2014. 
How much such seemingly enthusiastic responses from interviewed villagers 
were made with a clear understanding of their current and future 
circumstances is also yet to be verified. For instance, it is not clear if the level 
of villagers’ participation in collective affairs in the coming years would 
decrease after land expropriation and relocation, following the patterns 
identified by Sally Sargeson (2016) in her study of five villages in Zhejiang. 
There is also the possibility that villagers’ ‘voluntary’ move was associated 
with the implementation of successful preventive measures by the higher 
authorities using what Kevin O’Brien and Yanhua Deng (2017) refer to as 
‘psychological coercion’ and “relationship repression’. Also, the relocated 
villagers may incur a greater amount of expenditures while their actual 
income decreases, an experience of displaced farmers in Lynette Ong’s (2014) 
study in Hefei. It is also not clear if the villagers knew how profitable the 
resulting land businesses by the local state turned out to be, and if the amount 
of distributed compensation, either in kind or in cash, was adequate. Other 
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anecdotal evidence produced elsewhere suggests that there is a huge gap 
between the amount of land revenues and what is given out as compensation 
to villagers. For instance, a survey by an organisation called LANDESA in 2011 
reports that 43.1 per cent of the surveyed rural households experienced land-
taking, that ‘affected farmers received some compensation in 77.5% of all 
cases, were promised but did not receive compensation in 9.8% of cases, and 
were neither promised, nor received compensation in 12.7% of cases’, and that 
those compensated farmers received 18,739 Yuan as an average amount of 
compensation, which was only 2.4 per cent of average sales price earned by 
local authorities (LANDESA 2012). It is possible that the villagers interviewed 
above would have also been treated in a similar way but without their 
knowing. 
What is evident though is that urbanism as an institution and an ideology has 
gradually obscured the boundaries between the legitimacy of the state, the 
logic of capital accumulation, and the mode of life of ordinary people during 
the urbanisation process. The use of official urbanism turns out to be one of 
the mechanisms through which the urban strategies of the state are 
implemented yet at the same time concealed, co-opting villagers into 
endorsing the state project. 
Conclusion
In this chapter we have considered the use of green belts at the turn of the 
century by the Beijing Municipal Government to produce official urbanism 
that was utilised as a state project. We argue that ideological connotations of 
Beijing’s green belts had shifted to juxtapose the concern for green space with 
the appeal to be modern-international. Drawing on the changing discourses, 
state institutions and policies were in turn rearranged to give priority to 
mobilising political resources for the successful bidding of the Olympic Games 
in the first instance; but it was also evident that the ideological and political 
manoeuvres were mostly directed to realising the economic ambitions of 
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various state agents, who were facilitating land businesses in the name of 
conserving green belts. In this way, the green belts that originally articulated 
the socialist-utopian vision of the urban ecology were rendered a handy tool 
for the state-led and land-based accumulation in China’s ‘urban age’. While 
the focus of China’s official urbanism has fundamentally shifted from 
industrial production (in the 1950s) to land businesses (at present), the nature 
and the role of this official urbanism have not changed: such urbanism works 
as a state project in which political mobilisation and economic ambitions are 
practised and consolidated through the urbanist discourses. As pointed out by 
Lefebvre (2003: 140), ‘as an ideology, urbanism dissimulates its strategies. 
The critique of urbanism is characterised by the need for a critique of urbanist 
ideologies and urbanist practices (as partial, that is, reductive, practices and 
class strategies)’. 
Scholars often highlight land-based accumulation as the predominant 
character of China’s urban political economy and of its (neoliberal) urbanism 
(see for example, Lin et al. 2015; Lin and Zhang 2015). This is also evident in 
the story of Beijing’s green belts, but this chapter has gone further to ascertain 
that China’s urbanism is more than land-based accumulation. For, urbanism 
as a concrete mechanism incorporates the whole process in which land 
businesses are initiated, endorsed, and facilitated in the ideological, social and 
political aspects. The economic interests (in maximising land revenues) mark 
the key concern of the Party-state and its official urbanism, but they are not a 
proper point of departure, nor the destination, of empirical explorations. The 
economic ambition can never be materialised in a political and social vacuum; 
instead, it has to go through the integration of ideological connotations, 
political mobilisation and territorial-scalar collusion/collision among various 
levels of governments. This politico-economic dynamic marks the concrete 
mechanism through which urbanism is shaped into, and deployed as, an 
institution and an ideology for the Party-state.  
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In addition, the nature of the official urbanism as both an institution and an 
ideology is indeed dialectical in the sense that, on the one hand, its ideological 
connotations constitute part of the set of state institutions, and, on the other, 
this set of institutions is then deployed as an ideology to reshape the belief of 
the people. The articulation between Beijing’s green belts and the new urban 
political economy, for example, started from the moment when ideological 
connotations of these belts were rewritten in light of the Party-state’s new 
needs. Here, political mobilisation took place in order to lay the foundation 
for generating and capturing land values in the green belts. At the same time, 
however, the success of the state manoeuvre was possible only when the 
affected villagers with entitlement to compensation were compelled to accept 
the official urbanism as the only promising way of their life and hence 
embraced the state conduct. This is how the official urbanism as an ideology 
works as constraints on protesters and as a facilitating mechanism to 
encourage consenting villagers in endorsing the state’s ambitions. This 
recognition marks, for researchers in China urban studies, the potential 
added-value for the use of urbanism in understanding and analysing the great 
urban transformation of this country.  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Notes 
 There are two green belts in Beijing. The first one was included in the city’s master 1
plan in 1958, and the second one was proposed in 2003. While the first belt embodies 
the import of the green belt as an idea and showcases its persistence in the master 
plan, the second belt is merely an unsuccessful mimicry with a certain politico-
economic concern of the municipal authority (Zhang 2007). This will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
 The air pollution issue was, of course, not the only factor that led Beijing’s bid in 2
1993 to fail. A more critical factor was the issue of human rights, since it was just four 
years after the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. Human rights disputes 
induced geo-political pressures and both of these affected the whole lobbying 
campaign (Luo and Huang 2013; Riding 1993; Shin 2009a; Tyler 1993). 
 The calculation for the GBP from the Chinese Yuan here is based on the currency 3
rate on 1 January 2016 (9.6123 CNY per 1 GBP). Source: Exchange Rates UK. URL: 
http://www.exchangerates.org.uk/GBP-CNY-exchange-rate-history.html. Last 
accessed: 23 September 2016. 
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